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Abstract: From the perspective of fiscal decentralization，this paper empirically tests the relationship of fiscal decentraliza⁃
tion，corporate investment efficiency and capital allocation. The study shows that：In general，the higher the degree of fiscal
decentralization in the location of the listed company，the lower the degree of corporate overinvestment or underinvestment，
and the higher the corporate investment efficiency；Compared with private enterprises，the degree of local fiscal decentraliza⁃
tion has a more significant impact on investment and capital allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises，the level of over⁃
investment or underinvestment of state-owned enterprises is lower；Compared with central state-owned enterprises，the level
of overinvestment or underinvestment of local state-owned enterprises is lower. The fiscal decentralization system can effec⁃
tively reduce the damage of corporate overinvestment or underinvestment to corporate value，and make corporate investment
more to meet the market demand. The further study indicates that the effective market mechanism under the fiscal decentraliza⁃
tion system，which brings about the mitigation of financing constraints and reduces the first and second types of agency costs
inside enterprises，is an important reason for promoting the improvement of investment efficiency of local listed companies.

























































































































































































































































































































































invit = α + β1sizeit - 1 + β2levit - 1 + β3cashit - 1 +
β4growthit - 1 + β5listageit - 1 + β6returnit - 1 +
β7invit - 1 +∑year +∑industry + εit （1）
overinvit = α0 + β1cityfdit - 1 + β2 flowcashit + β3mfeeit - 1 +
β4occupyit - 1 + β5bigdesperit - 1 + β6citygdpit +










valueit = α0 + β1overinvit - 1 + β2overinv × cityfd +
β3cityfdit - 1 + β4levit - 1 + β5roeit - 1 + β6sizeit - 1 +
β7listageit - 1 + β8bigdesperit - 1 + β9indepratioit - 1 +














地方国有企业为 2 623个，民营企业为 1 999个。为
了消除极端值的影响，本文对数据库中连续变量上













































































































































































变量 Growth：托宾Qoverinv1 overinv1 overinv1 overinv1
Growth：市值账面比
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体的回归结果见表7所列。cashit =α + β1flowca shit + β2cityfdit - 1 × flowcashit +


























































































给股东造成的损失，即 Jensen and Meckling（1976）提
出的管理层与股东之间的第一类委托代理问题［19］；
另一是公司主要控股股东可能会“掠夺”公司的资源

















agencecostit =α + β1cityfdit - 1 + β2sizeit - 1 +
β3levit - 1 + β4 indepratioit - 1 +
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